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As witnessed by a continual parade of litigation, attorney
conflict of interest dilemmas occur with great frequency.' The
growth of the "megafirm," specializing in defined areas of the law
with offices in many cities as well as in foreign countries, has
multiplied the situations in which a firm may find itself represent-
ing adverse or potentially adverse clients.2. The increasing mobility
of lawyers has significantly raised the possibility of conflicts.3 This
problem is especially acute in the area of corporate and securities
law, which involve many large firms in one or a series of related
representations, and attorney movement among such firms is
common.
The judiciary's response to questions of conflict of interests,
as well as the rules of professional ethics, at times seemingly exac-
erbate the above problems. A number of court decisions reflect
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1 See, e.g., Note, Conflicts of Interest: Simultaneous Representation, 2 CEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 103, 103 n.1 (1988) (law firm settled an action for $27 million on alleged con-
flict of interest). As a general rule, federal district court orders granting or denying mo-
tions to disqualify opposing counsel are not immediately appealable. See Richard-Merrell,
Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985); Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984),
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981). See generally G.- HAZARD &
W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RuLES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUcT (1985).
2 Comment, Corporate Legal Ethics-An Empirical Study: The Model Rules, The Code of
Professional Responsibility, and Counsel's Continuing Struggle Between Theory and Practice, 8 J.
CORP. L 601, 651 (1983). Law firm use of computers is helpful, if not necessary, in
ascertaining the existence of conflicts of interest. See Keane, Microcomputers Can Resolve
Conflicts of Interest, Legal Times, June 10, 1985, at 13.
3 See generally Bishop, An Equitable Alternative to the Discriminatoy Imposition of Vi-
carious Firm Disqualification, 31 WAYNE L. REv. 1030 (1985).
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the inconsistency and vagueness that exist in this area. These
decisions generally fail to recognize that conflict questions arise in
a wide variety of situations. Each of these situations involves dif-
ferent issues and requires separate treatment. The potential conse-
quence is the widespread recognition of unduly broad rules which
in turn will lead to undesirable results.4 In addition, both the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct do not adequately balance the competing
interests of clients and the practicing bar. This failure results in a
wooden framework that disserves everyone.5
This article will focus on conflict questions arising in the
context of attorney movement between firms with respect to both
present and former clients. As discussed below, the rules of pro-
fessional ethics and decisions in this area are far from acceptable.
Their inadequacy is due to their failure to recognize fundamental
differences between various types of conflict questions. This defi-
ciency has precipitated an increase in disqualification motions and
further complicated an already difficult area of the law.
II. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST-IN GENERAL
A. Simultaneous Representation
Possible conflicts of interest relating to the representation of
adverse clients arise in two broad contexts. The first involves the
simultaneous representation of adverse or potentially adverse par-
ties.' For example, the principal office of a law firm situated in
4 Compare Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983) with Freeman v.
Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1982). Each case applies the
same analysis, although they involve extremely different situations. For examples of the
results of such decisions on lower court determinations, see infra notes 134-149 and ac-
companying text.
5 See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text. It is clear that the Bar's ethical
rules do not have the force of law. As the Ninth Circuit has observed: "Until the Model
Code is adopted as law by the courts, the legislature, or the regulatory authority charged
with the discipline of lawyers in a particular jurisdiction, the canons and disciplinary
rules of the Model Code are merely hortatory, not proscriptive." Paul E. Iacono Structur-
al Eng'r, Inc. v. Humphrey, 722 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1983).
6 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1980) provides in per-
tinent part:
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his indepen-
dent professional judgment on behalf of a client will be or is likely to be ad-
versely affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, or if it would
be likely to involve him in representing differing interests, except to the extent
permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his
[Vol. 66:1
CONFLICTS OF INITIEST
New York City may act as outside counsel in a public offering by
a corporation, while the Chicago branch office of the same firm
represents the plaintiff in an employment discrimination suit
against the corporation. In this context, courts have generally
adopted a prima facie prophylactic rule which prohibits attorneys
from simultaneously representing clients with adverse interests,
even in unrelated matters.7 Simultaneous representation is per-
mitted only if the potential for actual conflict is minimal and the
respective clients consent after disclosure of the common repre-
sentation and its implications.' The rule against simultaneous
representation is based principally on the duty of undivided loyal-
independent professional judgement on behalf of a client will be or is likely to
be adversely affected by his representation of another client, or if it would be
likely to involve him in representing differing interests, except to the extent
permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(C) In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may represent
multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of
each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the pos-
sible effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent judgment
on behalf of each ... .
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1989) states:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely
affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to the other client or
to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be ad-
versely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of
multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall
include explanation of the implications of the common representation
and the advantages and risks involved.
7 See, e.g., IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (Sd Cir. 1978); MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (1989) ("Ordinarily, a lawyer may not act as advo-
cate against a client the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if the other
matter is wholly unrelated.").
8 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (1989) ("For
example, a lawyer representing an enterprise with diverse operations may accept em-
ployment as an advocate against the enterprise in an unrelated matter if doing so will
not affect the lawyer's relationship with the enterprise or conduct of the suit and if both
clients consent upon consultation."); United States v. Nabisco, 117 F.R.D. 40, 44
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (prima fade prohibition unless no actual or apparent conflict and con-
sent obtained from both parties); See generally Steinberg, Corporate/Securities Coun-
sel-Conflicts of Interest, 8 J. CORP. L. 577, 579-84 (1983); Developments in the Law-Conflicts
of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L REV. 1244, 1269-72 (1981) [hereinafter
Developments].
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ty.Y Both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility"° and
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct adopt the above rule
against simutaneous representation." Courts have held that the
rule applies equally to individual attorneys as well as law firms,
irrespective of a law firm's size. 1
2
Representation of multiple parties with potentially adverse
interests is not prohibited per se."3 Counsel may undertake a
representation, provided that counsel reasonably believes the po-
9 See Williams v. Reed, 29 F. Cas. 1386, 1390 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,732)
("When a client employs an attorney he has a right to presume, if the latter be silent
on the point, that he has no engagements which interfere, in any degree, with his
exclusive devotion to the cause confided to him; that he has no interest which may
betray his judgment or endanger his fidelity."); Developments, supra note 8, at 1295-96
("[O]ne's loss translates directly into another's gain, [and] the fiduciary will almost
certainly be unable to avoid a breach of his duty to promote the interests of each with
loyal vigor.").
10 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1980) provides that "[a]
lawyer should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client." Various
Ethical Considerations also address this subject. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-14, 5-15, 5-16, 5-17, 5-18 and 5-19 (1980). Ethical Consideration 5-
15, in conjunction with EC 5-16, provides that a lawyer should carefully weigh the pos-
sibility that counsel's loyalty may be impaired and, if justified in representing both
parties, must nonetheless obtain the consent of both parties. MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-15, 5-16 (1980).
11 The Model Rules are much more straightforward in their prohibition of simulta-
neous representation:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will
be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely
affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a) (1989).
12 See LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 257 (7th Cir. 1983) (si-
multaneous representation prohibited regardless of size of firm or screening mecha-
nisms); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee, 580 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th Cir. 1978)
("Chinese Walls" ineffective to overcome prohibition against simultaneous representation).
In United States v. Nabisco, 117 F.R.D. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), the court stated:
Generally, in cases where the movant establishes that a law firm is simulta-
neously employed by two or more adverse parties in the same action, such rep-
resentation is deemed 'pima fade improper.' To rebut this characterization, the
law firm that is the target of the motion must establish that: (1) its clients have
consented to the adverse representation or (2) at the very least, . . . there will
be no actual or apparent conflict in loyalties or diminution in the vigor of [its]
representation.
Id. at 44 (citing Cinema 5 Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1387 (2d Cir. 1976)).
With respect to simultaneous representation problems induced by two law firms merging
(merger-induced conflict of interest), see Picker Int'l v. Varian Assoc., 869 F.2d 578 (Fed.
Cir. 1989), and Harte Biltmore Ltd. v. First Penn. Bank, 655 F. Supp. 419 (S.D. Fla.
1987).
13 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
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tential conflict will not adversely affect the rendition, of legal ser-
vices in the best interests of each client and each client consents
to the multiple representation after explanation of the pertinent
ramifications. 4 Multiple representation in the corporate setting
may include (depending on an ad hoc evaluation that no dis-
abling conflict of interest exists and that the requisite client con-
sent has been given): drafting a shareholder agreement for clients
desiring to form a close corporation, 15 representing both the cor-
poration and corporate fiduciaries in a shareholder derivative suit
alleging misconduct by such fiduciaries, 6 serving as counsel to a
registered broker-dealer and to the subject registered representa-
tives in a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement
action,'7 and representing both the corporate entity and manage-
ment in acquisitions for corporate control.'8
B. Successive Representation
A second type of conflict may arise when a lawyer or law
firm seeks to represent a client whose interests are adverse to a
former client without the former client's consent. 9 This situation
14 See supra note 8.
15 See L SOLOMON, D. SCHWARTZ & J. BAUMAN, CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY
129-33 (2d ed. 1988).
16 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(e) (1989); Developments,
supra note 8, at 1341 ("The better rule is to require that outside counsel represent the
corporation, while the corporate attorney represents the insider defendant."). Compare
Messing v. FDI, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 776, 782 n.8 (D.N.J. 1977) ("The need for indepen-
dent counsel is underscored by the duty of counsel for the corporation in a derivative
suit to safeguard the corporation's interest.") with Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 57 F.
Supp. 680, 684 (E.D. Pa. 1944) ("iThere are many stockholders' suits on record in
which the same counsel represented both the individual and corporate defendants.").
17 See, In re First Republic Bank Securities Litigation, [1989 Transfer Binder) Fed.
Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 1 94,554 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (where attorney received consents from
plaintiffs having potential conflict of interest problem, multiple representation of such cli-
ents not grounds for disqualification); In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,608 (ALJ 1973) (where only
potential conflict exists, and after being informed of the implications, clients consent to
the multiple representation, such representation permitted). See generally M. STEINBERG &
R. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT (1985 & 1990
Supp.); Sonde, The Responsibility of Professionals Under the Federal Securities Laws-Some
Observations, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 11 (1973).
18 For discussion on this subject, see Steinberg, Attorneys Conflicts of Interest in Corpo-
rate Acquisitions, 39 HASTINGS LJ. 579 (1988).
19 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (1989):
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not there-
after represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in
which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the for-
1990]
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is referred to as "successive representation."" Unlike simulta-
neous representation, successive representation is not prima facie
improper.21
The duty to preserve client confidences is the primary ethical
consideration implicated by successive representation. 22 For this
reason, it is argued that lawyers need not be prohibited from
advocating interests adverse to their former clients unless the past
representation involved confidences that could be damaging to
the former client in the successive representation.
Successive representation implicates both the duty of loyalty
and the preservation of the attorney-client relationship. 2 Attor-
neys "profess and owe undivided loyalty to their clients."24 To
use confidences against a former client in a later matter would
violate the duty of loyalty owed to the former client and make
future clients reluctant to disclose confidences. 25 The foundation
of the attorney-client relationship would thus be undermined.26
Courts have adopted the "substantial relationship" test, first
enunciated in T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures,27 to de-
mer client unless the former client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substan-
tially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was asso-
dated had previously represented a client,
(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by
Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter;
unless the former client consents after consultation.
20 See generally C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 7.1 (1987).
21 See T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (E.D.N.Y.
1953); cases discussed infra notes 27-49 and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098 (10th Cir. 1985); Satellite Fin. Plan-
ning v. First Nat'l Bank of Wilmington, 652 F. Supp. 1281 (D. Del. 1987); Developments,
supna, note 4, at 1352.
Note that the term "confidences" in this context is not confined by the attorney-
client privilege. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 comment
(1989) ("The confidentiality rule applies not merely to matters communicated in confi-
dence by the client but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever
its source.").
23 See Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Mgt. Corp., 216 F.2d 920
(2d Cir. 1954); In re Evans, 113 Ariz. 458, 556 P.2d 792 (1976).
24 Duncan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 646 F.2d 1020, 1027 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).
25 See Steinberg, supra note 8, at 585.
26 See Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 570-71 (2d Cir. 1973)
("Without strict enforcement of such high ethical standards, a client would hardly be in-
clined to discuss his problems freely and in depth with his lawyer, for he would justifi-
ably fear that information he reveals to his lawyer one day may be used against him on
the next.")
27 113 F. Supp. 265 (E.D.N.Y. 1953).
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termine if a successive representation should be permitted. Under
this standard, if the issues presented in the previous representa-
tion bear a substantial relationship to issues in the successive
representation, a lawyer participating in the first representation is
irrebuttably presumed to have received confidential informa-
tion.28 The former client whose interests are materially adverse
to the issues raised in the successive representation need not
demonstrate that any relevant confidences were in fact disclosed.
The rationale underlying the presumption is that to force the
client to make such a showing would mandate disclosure in court
of the very confidences that the client seeks to protect.29
In applying the substantial relationship test, courts30 have
cited Model Code Canon 4, which provides that lawyers should
preserve client confidences,31 and Canon 9, which provides that
lawyers should avoid "even the appearance of professional impro-
priety." ' On the other hand, the Model Rules specifically adopt
the substantial relationship test 3 and explicitly decline to apply
the appearance of impropriety standard as a basis for disquali-
fication.34 Although the appearance of impropriety formula is
vague and leads to uncertain results, 5 it nonetheless serves the
useful function of stressing that disqualification properly may be
imposed to protect the reasonable expectations of former and
present clients. The impropriety standard also promotes the
public's confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. For
28 Id. at 268.
29 See, e.g., Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 1980); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978); T.C. Theatre, 113 F. Supp. at 268.
30 See. e.g., Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098, 1100 (10th Cir. 1985); Ettinger v.
Cranberry Hill Corp., 665 F. Supp. 368, 370 (M.D. Pa. 1986).
31 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1980).
32 Id Canon 9.
33 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (1989), supra note 19;
Riger, The Model Rules and Coporate Practice-New Ethics for a Competitive Era, 17 CONN.
L REV. 729, 747-52 (1985).
34 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment, Rule 1.9 com-
ment (1989).
35 See Kramer, The Appearance of Impropriety under Canon 9: A Study of the Federal
Judicial Process Applied to Lawyers, 65 MINN. L REV. 243 (1987)). Compare Armstrong v.
McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (case of subsequent representation
where any possible appearance of impropriety was not a sufficient reason for a disqualifi-
cation order due to serious consequences which would have resulted from such an order
and since the appearance of impropriety was not very clear), vacated for lack of jurisdic-
tion, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981), with Iacono Structural Eng'r, -Inc. v. Humphrey, 722 F.2d 435
(9th Cir. 1983) (case of subsequent representation where Canon 9 prohibition required
disqualification where substantial relationship existed between former and present adverse
representation).
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these reasons, courts should retain the appearance of impropriety
standard as an independent basis of assessment."6 This standard
should be sparingly invoked by itself, but more often used in
conjunction with the substantial relationship standard.
As the substantial relationship test has gained universal recog-
nition,7 courts have refined and relaxed the test as enunciated
in T.C. Theatre. For example, the Seventh Circuit has held that a
court must engage in a three-step analysis to determine if the
representations are substantially related.3" The court must first
conduct a factual reconstruction of the prior representation and
assess its nature and scope. 9 Second, it must determine whether
a reasonable inference exists that confidential information would
have been communicated to the lawyer in the course of the first
representation." Finally, the court must decide if this informa-
tion is relevant to the issues presented in the successive repre-
sentation.4 '
The Second Circuit has lessened the onus of disqualification
caused by strict application of the T.C. Theatre substantial relation-
ship test. The Second Circuit will not disqualify a lawyer unless
the relationship between the issues in the former and current
representations is "patently clear,"42 meaning that they are "iden-
tical" or "substantially the same."43 Courts in other jurisdictions
36 See generally Aronson, Conflict of Interest, 52 WASH. L. REv. 807, 810-11 (1977);
Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of Multiple Clients: A Proposed
Solution to the Current Confusion and Controversy, 61 TEX. L. REv. 211, 228 (1982). But see
WOLFRAM, supra note 20, at 322 ("But courts lack both access to reliable facts and a
workable method for thinking through, on a case-by-case basis, the question whether the
particular result sought by one or the other of the parties will increase, decrease, or
leave unaffected the general level of public or private confidence.").
37 See Tashier & Casper, Vicarious Disqualication of Co-counsel Because of "Taint", 1
GEO. J. LEGAL ETfIcs 155, 166 (1987).
38 LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 255 (7th Cir. 1983); Novo
Terapeutisk Laboratorium v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 607 F.2d 186, 190-91
(7th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
39 LaSalle, 703 F.2d at 255.
40 Id. at 255-56.
41 Id. at 256. For an analysis of the Seventh and Second Circuits' approaches to the
substantial relationship test, see Comment, Conflicts of Interest: Subsequent Adverse Representa-
tion, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 119, 121-24 (1988).
42 See Government of India v. Cook Indus., 569 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1978); Silver
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
43 See Government of India, 569 F.2d at 740; United States Football League v. Nation-
al Football League, 605 F. Supp. 1448, 1457 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). An attorney-client rela-
tionship must exist with respect to the former client before the substantial relationship
test can be invoked. Hence, the scope of the test may hinge on whether a broad or re-
strictive standard is applied to the establishment of an attorney-client relationship. In
ascertaining whether the attorney and prior client had a substantial relationship, courts
[Vol. 66:1
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have relaxed the T.C. Theatre test,44 although some to a lesser
degree.45
In addition to relaxing the test, the Second Circuit has recog-
nized a "peripheral representation" exception to the substantial re-
lationship test. The court introduced this doctrine in Silver Chrys-
ler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chtysler Motor Corp.46 In Silver, the court ad-
dressed a motion to disqualify the plaintiffs lawyer on the
grounds that he had represented the defendant while working in
his previous position as. an associate at a large law firm. The
court noted that substantially related matters may have involved
the lawyer at the old firm. Nonetheless, because this involvement
was limited to "brief, informal discussions on procedural matters
or research on a specific point of law,"47 the court concluded
that this minimal involvement was not a "prior representation" as
defined in T.C. Theatre. The substantial relationship test was thus
not met.48 Several decisions since Silver have adopted this ratio-
nale.49
Although the substantial relationship test is more lenient than
the prima facie rule against simultaneous representation, it may
be farther reaching. Disqualification for simultaneous representa-
tion forces lawyers and law firms to choose to represent one cli-
may consider the time period that has elapsed between the current and former represen-
tations. The longer the time period, "the less likely the appearance of impropriety and
substantiality in the relationship between the matters." Note, Motions to Disqualify Counsel
Representing an Interest Adverse to a Former Client, 57 TEXAS L REV. 726, 733 (1979), (cit-
ing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1322 (7th Cir. 1978)
and General Motors Corp. v. City of Nei4 York, 501 F.2d 639, 650 n. 21 (2d Cir.
1974)).
44 See City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illumination, 440 F. Supp. 193, 208 (N.D.
Ohio 1977), a ffd mnem, 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir.), cer. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978).
45 See Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 1980) ("reasonable probability" '
that information disclosed in the former representation will be useful in the successive
representation); Satellite Fin. Planning v. First Nat'l Bank of Wilmington, 652 F. Supp.
1281, 1284 (D. Del. 1987) (utilizing the substantial relationship test with "cautious scruti-
ny" and cautioning against letting "imagination run free" when determining whether
confidential information was disclosed). For state court decisions in this area, see the
cases discussed in Comment, Disqualifcation of Attorneys and Their Firms for Conflicts of
Interest: A Lack of Consistency in Both Federal and State Courts, 26 WASHBURN I.J. 493, 515-
23 (1987).
46 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
47 Id. at 756.
48 Id. at 757.
49 See Atasi Corp. v. Seagate Technology, 847 F.2d 826, 829 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
United States ev reL Lord Elec. Co. v. Titan Pac. Const., 637 F. Supp. 1556, 1561 (W.D.
Wash. 1986); Papst Motoren GMBH & Co., KG v. Manematsu-Gashu, 629 F. Supp. 864,,
876 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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ent or another at a particular time." Although this may cause a
problem for firms forced to choose between two prospective cli-
ents,5" the disqualification only lasts as long as the client's inter-
ests are adverse. 2 In the area of successive representation, dis-
qualification may continue indefinitely. As long as related matters
are outstanding, there is the potential for disqualification.' This




Traditionally, if a lawyer is ineligible to represent a particular.
client, all members of the lawyer's firm also are ineligible. This
general rule is contained in both the Model Code and the Model
Rules. The Model Code provides that "[i]f a lawyer is required
to ... withdraw from employment... no partner, or associate,
or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, may accept or
continue such employment."54 Similarly, the Model Rules provide
that "[w]hile lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall
knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing
alone would be prohibited from doing so."55
The basis for vicarious disqualification is the "presumption of
shared confidences," which seeks to prevent disclosure of client
confidences, preserve counsel loyalty, and avoid the appearance of
impropriety.5 Under this presumption, when a lawyer is shown
to have received confidences, the lawyer is presumed to have
shared them with members of his firm. 7 Traditionally, the
courts and the rules of professional ethics view this as an irrebut-
50 If counsel already represents multiple parties, he or she may well be foreclosed
from representing any party in the event of a disabling conflict. This is due to concerns
with maintaining client confidences and secrets, counsel's loyalty, and the appearance of
impropriety. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 12.
51 Comment, supra note 2, at 651. This is especially true considering that the repre-
sentations do not need to be related in any way. Id. at 656. Also, courts have not been
receptive to "Chinese Wall" defenses in this context. See infra notes 150-157 and accom-
panying text
52 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (1989).
53 Id. Rule 1.9 comment.
54 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D) (1980).
55 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10(a) (1989).
56 See, e.g., Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir.
1977).
57 See, e.g., Amoco Chemicals Corp. v. MacArthur, 568 F. Supp. 42, 45 (N.D. Ga.




It is important to note that the'two presumptions discussed
above are distinct. Before the presumption of shared confidences
is invoked to vicariously "taint" a law firm, one must determine if
the "primary" lawyer is tainted.59 In successive representation
cases, if the application of the substantial relationship test does
not warrant presuming that the former client disclosed relevant
confidences to counsel, the question of vicarious disqualification
will never be reached."
Many situations occur where vicarious disqualification may
prevent counsel and her law firm from engaging in a representa-
tion. In varying degrees, each of these situations presents prob-
lems of balancing interests.
B. Relevant Interests
Several interests are promoted by utilizing the presumption
of shared confidences in successive representation cases. These
interests include the former client's interest in protecting confi-
dences, the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the former client, and the
judicial system's interest in avoiding the appearance of impropri-
ety.61 As courts and commentators increasingly recognize, some
countervailing interests are implicated by disqualifying counsel on
the grounds of successive representation. The first, and most of-
ten cited, is the new client's interest in retaining his counsel of
choice.62 Disqualification of counsel also involves other hardships
58 Neither the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10(a) nor the MOD-
EL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(D) provide for rebuttal of the
presumption in cases involving non-government attorneys. As will be seen, infra notes 71-
149 and accompanying text, a number of courts now permit the presumption against
vicarious disqualification in such successive representation cases to be rebutted. See
Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sldar & Allen, 849 F.2d 222, 226 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[We
see no reason why the considerations which led the American Bar Association to ap-
prove appropriate screening for former government attorneys, should not apply in the
case of private attorneys who change their association.").
59 See Steinberg, supra note 8, at 589 (and cases cited therein).
60 See id.; Caracciolo v. Ballard, 687 F. Supp. 159 (E.D. Pa. 1988). Unfortunately,
courts sometimes confuse the two presumptions. See Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic
Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984). "
61 See supra notes 22-27, 37 and accompanying text.
62 See Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1576; Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir.
1983); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 753 (2d
Cin 1975); Steinberg, supra note 8, at 586; Tashier & Casper, supra note 37, at 157.
Nonetheless, the point certainly can be made that no party has the right to "tainted"
counsel who is privy to confidences of the former client. See supra notes 22-26, 36 and
accompanying text.
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for the new client, 3 including increased cost, possible loss of
work product, 4 delay,65 and the psychological stress incident to
having trusted counsel replaced with an unknown quantity.6 6
Imputed disqualification also works significant hardship on
the affected lawyer. Disqualification may reflect negatively on a
lawyer's character.6 7 Further, the threat of disqualification has
the potential to severely limit the mobility of attorneys, 68 particu-
larly specialists.69
In weighing the above interests, it must also be recognized
that disqualification motions are often abused. Such motions are
increasingly being used as tools to harass the opposing party or
force a settlement.
7 °
63 See Bishop, supra note 3, at 1047.
64 See EZ Paintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc., 746 F.2d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1984); First Wiscon-
sin Mortgage Trust v. First Wisconsin Corp., 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978); Comment,
The Availability of Work Product of a Disqualified Attorney: What Standard?, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 1607 (1979).
65 See Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1987); Winslow, Federal
Courts and Attorney Disqualification Motions: A Realistic Approach to Conflicts of Interest, 62
WASH. L. REv. 863, 864 (1987).
66 See Peterson, Rebuttable Presumptions and Intra-Firm Screening: The New Seventh Cit.
cuit Approach to Vicarious Disqualifcation of Litigation Counsel, 59 NoTRE DAME L REV.
399, 401 (1984).
67 See Government of India v. Cook Indus., 56.9 F.2d 737, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1978)
(Mansfield C.J., concurring); Comment, supra note 2, at 652. Cf. General Elec. Co. v.
Indus. Prods., 683 F. Supp. 1254, 1260 (N.D. Ind. 1988) (irrebuttable presumption
assumes attorneys are unethical).
68 See, e.g., Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 518 F.2d 751,
755 (2d Cir. 1975); NFC, Inc. v. General Nutrition, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 332, 334 (D.
Mass. 1983); Bishop, supra note 3, at 1032; Winslow, supra note 66, at 864.
69 In some areas of law, such as SEC enforcement practice, attorneys may develop
specialties that are useful to only a fairly small number of clients. Because the pool of
potential clients is relatively small, attorneys engaged in such a practice will be especially
reluctant to hire an attorney if it will prevent the entire firm from serving a number of
such potential clients. See Comment, supra note 2, at 1366.
70 Richardson-Merrel, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436, 440 (1985); Panduit Corp. v.
All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Trinity Ambulance Serv. v.
G&L Ambulance Serv., 578 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Conn. 1984); Goldberg, The Former Client's
Disqualification Gambit: A Bad Move in Pursuit of an Ethical Anomaly, 72 MINN. L. REV.
227, 279 (1987) ("The costs [of the successive conflict disqualification doctrine] to the
system and to individuals are disproportionately large.").
The effectiveness of using such motions as a delaying tactic may be somewhat
reduced by the Supreme Court's holdings- that the denial or granting of disqualification
motions are not immediately appealable. See cases cited supra note 1.
Another possible means to deter such a use of motions for disqualification is the
imposition of sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Given
the uncertainty in this area of the law, however, and that Rule 11 requires that an
argument be "warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification or reversal of existing law," it may be difficult to justify the imposition of
sanctions in many cases. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Perhaps for this reason, Rule 11 is not
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C. Current State of the Law
The significant costs incident to the disqualification of attor-
neys is slowly eroding the irrebuttable presumption of shared
confidences. As the cases examined in the following section of
this article demonstrate, there is a trend in the federal courts
towards allowing counsel to rebut this presumption. This devel-
opment is occurring even though the applicable ethical rules gen-
erally do not permit screening or other mechanisms to avert firm-
wide disqualification, absent waiver by the affected client.7 1
The movement towards relaxing the presumption of shared
confidences appears warranted, given the realities of the modem
practice of law. Although protecting client confidences is an im-
portant consideration, the use of an irrebuttable presumption
does not give sufficient weight to competing concerns such as
attorney mobility, the modern day realities of law firm practice,
and the client's right to counsel of choice.72 In this respect, the
growth of the "megafirm," to a significant degree, undermines the
logical basis for the presumption. It may be reasonable to assume
that all of the lawyers in a small firm will share in the confidenc-
es of each of the firm's clients. It is quite different to irrebuttably
presume that a lawyer in the Chicago office of a 500-lawyer firm
obtained confidential information about a client represented by a
lawyer in the firm's New York office.
73
Similarly, the increasing specialization of the practice of law
weighs in favor of relaxing the presumption. For example, a law-
yer in a large firm's estates and trusts department is unlikely, as a
matter of course, to obtain confidential information about a client
represented by the firm's corporate litigation department. In
today's highly specialized and mobile practice of law, inferring an
irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences in all successive
often used in this context. Comment, Federal Courts and Attorney Disqualification" Motions:
A Realistic Approach to Conflicts of Interest, 62 WASH. L. REV. 863, 874 (1987).
71 See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.10 comment (1989). But see
PENNSYLVANIA MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1987) (permitting screening of
affected attorney and notice to client as a means to avert firm-wide disqualification). See
also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Informal Op. 88-1526, dis-
cussed in Reich, Beyond Yes and No, 75 A.B.A. J. 114 (June 1989) (permitting law firm to
avert vicarious disqualification when personally disqualified non-lawyer is affiliated with
the firm provided that non-lawyer is subject to appropriate screening mechanisms). For a
definition of "screening," see infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
72 See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying texL
73 See generally Winslow, supra note 65, at 874; Comment, supra note 45, at 514.
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representation situations fails to give appropriate weight to con-
temporary realities.
Hence, the current judicial trend relaxing the presumption of
shared confidences is laudable. However, the approach adopted
by a number of courts is deficient. In particular, some courts
have failed to recognize that the numerous situations in which
vicarious disqualification issues may arise each involve distinct
problems and warrant separate consideration. As shown below,
while certain situations justify allowing rebuttal of the pre-
sumption, others do not. Too many courts fail to recognize this
distinction. Instead, these courts aggregate questions implicating
vicarious disqualification. They issue broad pronouncements as to
whether the presumption of shared confidences is rebuttable and,
if so, what steps are necessary to rebut the *presumption.74 By
using such faulty analysis, courts have established dangerous pre-
cedents and invited even more litigation of disqualification mo-
tions.
D. Varieties of Vicarious Disqualification
The following discussion sets forth the usual situations in
which vicarious disqualification issues may arise and examines the
desirability of a rebuttable presumption in each situation. There
are at least five situations in which vicarious disqualification may
prevent attorneys from engaging in the successive representation
of adverse clients. These include cases involving firms "switching
sides" and attorney movement between firms.
1. Firms "Switching Sides."
The first situation, and the one that calls for an irrebuttable
presumption to be universally applied, occurs when the primary
lawyers in both the first and the successive representations are
members of the same firm. In other words, the firm switches
sides. For example, lawyer X from firm A defends XYZ corpora-
tion in a securities fraud case. While lawyer X is still employed at
Firm A, and after the end of the first case, lawyer Y from firm A
represents the plaintiff in a second related securities litigation
matter against XYZ.
This scenario presents a strong case for disqualification: it
raises concerns regarding the transmission of confidential informa-
74 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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tion to the disadvantage of the former client, the zeal of represen-
tation that was rendered, and the unseemliness of these lawyers in
the public's view. Moreover, adopting an irrebuttable presumption
in this situation would not adversely affect the movement of attor-
neys between firms.
Another variable that militates for firm-wide disqualification is
that screening the affected lawyers involved in the first case may
be difficult, considering that many lawyers at the firm may be
involved in both cases. Further, even if the firm were to adopt
screening mechanisms, this does not address the possibility that a
primary attorney in the second litigation received confidential
information before the screening process began. Perhaps for these
reasons, courts rarely permit rebuttal of the presumption of
shared confidences in this situation.75
2. Attorney Movement Between Firms.
The remaining four scenarios involve an attorney switching
firms. Each of these cases presents a different potential for the
misuse of confidential information, and to some extent, courts
treat each of these differently.
(a) "Situation One" Cases. -The "situation one" cases are
those in which a lawyer not directiy involved in a representation
moves to a firm that represents an adverse client, but does not
become involved in the representation at the second firm. For
example, assume that Firm A represents corporation XYZ as de-
fense counsel in a securities fraud case. Firm B represents the
plaintiff. Lawyer X at Firm A, who is not involved in the litiga-
tion, leaves Firm A and takes a position with Firm B. X does not
work on the litigation at Firm B.
75 Apparently, only one court has denied a motion for disqualification in such a
situation. City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193 (N.D.
Ohio), a~fd mem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cen. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978). The
facts of this case, however, are unique. The movant caused the conflict by requesting
legal services from a firm it knew was a long-time client of its opponent. The court held
that the movant was therefore estopped from asserting a conflict. 440 F. Supp. at 203.
The court went on, in dicta, to say that the presumption of shared confidences is
rebuttable. Id. at 209. Contra Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098, 1102 (10th Cir. 1985)
(presumption irrebuttable); Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1267
(7th Cir. 1983) (presumption not rebuttable when entire firm switches sides); Westing-
house Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978) (firm that switched
sides disqualified).
For further discussion on the use of screening mechanisms, see infra notes 89-95,
98-103, 126-132 and accompanying text.
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In cases such as these, several courts will find it unnecessary
to address the presumption of shared confidences. For example,
the Second Circuit, under its peripheral representation exception,
would not consider that X had participated in a "representation"
of XYZ while she was at Firm A.6 Under the substantial rela-
tionship test, the court would not disqualify X from representing
an adverse party in a related matter. Because X herself is not dis-
qualified, the question of vicarious disqualification never arises.77
Courts that have not adopted the peripheral representation
exception or a similar exception must address the question of
vicarious disqualification. The traditional presumption of shared
confidences test would disqualify Firm B from representing the
plaintiff.7 X is tainted by her association with Firm A, and by
moving to Firm B, taints Firm B as well. Courts, however, are
unwilling to stretch the presumption quite that far. Courts have
either adopted a flat rule that disqualification may not be imput-
ed from a lawyer who is herself vicariously disqualified, 9 or have
denied disqualification on some other grounds.
8 0
Disallowing vicarious disqualification in situation one cases
ordinarily makes a great deal of sense. If knowledge imputed to a
lawyer may be imputed to other lawyers at different firms, vicari-
ous disqualification could "continue ad infinitum."' Moreover,
the risk of disclosure is minimal since the lawyer is neither direct-
ly involved nor privy to confidential information in either the
former or current representation. Thus, a rule placing the burden
on the challenged firm to produce affidavits demonstrating that
the lawyer was not involved in either representation and was not
privy to confidential information relating to such representation
should be sufficient to protect client confidences in these situa-
tions.
76 See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text. In such cases, the analysis utilized
by the Seventh Circuit should reach the lead to result. See supra notes 38-41 and accom-
panying text.
77 See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
78 See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
79 Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1579 (Fed. Cir.
1984); American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1129 (5th Cir. 1971).
80 See Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1983)
(applying Seventh Circuit rebuttable presumption but nonetheless denying disqualifica-
tion).
81 American Can, 436 F.2d at 1129. The court further noted that applying such a




(b) "Situation Two" Cases.-Situation two presents a more
difficult scenario. In such cases, a lawyer who was not directly in-
volved in the prior representation wishes to directly represent an
adverse client in the second representation. Using the above ex-
ample, assume that X does not work directly on the securities
fraud case at Firm A. After moving to Firm B during the course
of the litigation, X wishes to represent the plaintiff in the same
case.
In situation two cases, several courts apply the peripheral
representation exception, or a similar exception, and authorize X
to undertake the representation.8 2 Moreover, even in those juris-
dictions that decline to apply such an exception, it is reasonable
to permit rebuttal of the presumption of shared confidences. 3
Although the second representation directly involves the chal-
lenged lawyer, inadvertent disclosure is not a significant issue. The
challenged lawyer who did not take part in the prior representa-
tion has left the firm that possesses the affected client's confi-
dences. The danger of the lawyer receiving confidential informa-
tion through daily informal contact with attorneys who are repre-
senting the former client is thus no longer present. Moreover, if
the challenged attorney received confidential information before
leaving the firm, the former client should find it easier to demon-
strate this fact because the lawyer's former colleagues no longer
have an incentive to protect the lawyer. Indeed, for "abandoning
ship," they may have a stronger impetus to seek disqualification.
Hence, requiring the challenged lawyer to execute a sworn state-
ment as well as to produce affidavits from his former colleagues
that the challenged attorney was not privy to confidential informa-
tion should effectively rebut the presumption.
8 4
82 See supra notes 38-49, 77-and accompanying text.
83 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10(b) and comment (1989).
According to the comment, Rule 1.10(b) adopts the peripheral representation exception.
The comment makes clear that when the attorney in the prior representation received
no confidential information, neither the lawyer nor the law firm in the successive repre-
sentation is disqualified even if the interests of the former and present client conflict. In
any event, the comment provides that the presumption of shared confidences may be
rebutted by the law firm seeking to avoid vicarious disqualification.
84 See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 752 (2d
Cir. 1975). The court did not need to address this issue because, as noted above, appli-
cation of the peripheral representation exception led the court to conclude that the
primary lawyer was not disqualified. The court stated in dicta, however, that a lawyer's
sworn statements, along with the statements of his former colleagues, are sufficient to re-
but the presumption in such cases. See also Gas-A-Tron of Arizona v. Union Oil Co., 534
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The risk of intentional disclosure of confidences revealed in
the prior representation is slight. One of the rationales underlying
the presumption of shared confidences is that lawyers in a firm
are economically interdependent, and may be tempted to disclose
any confidences which will assist the firm's clients. In situation
two scenarios, however, there is no economic advantage-and in-
deed there may exist a financial disincentive-for those who pos-
sess the confidences to disclose them. The lawyer who would
benefit from such revelation is not a member of their firm. In-
deed, if the firm that the challenged lawyer left is still represent-
ing the former client, disclosing confidences would work against
the firm's economic interests.
(c) "Situation Three" Cases.-Situation three presents an ana-
lytically similar, but less commonly litigated scenario. In this situa-
tion, a lawyer possessing confidences disclosed in a prior related
representation leaves the firm. The lawyer's previous firm then
represents an adverse client in a successive representation. For
example, assume that lawyer X is employed at Firm A where he
represents XYZ corporation as defense counsel in a securities
fraud case. The litigation does not involve any other lawyers at
Firm A. X leaves Firm A, taking the XYZ account with him. A
few months later, the plaintiff in a related securities fraud case
against corporation XYZ asks Firm A to represent him.85
Situation three cases present difficult analytical problems. In
one sense, they may be viewed under the rule that whole firms
may not switch sides. In the above example, Firm A, through X,
had previously represented XYZ in a related matter. Nevertheless,
because X was the only member of the firm who received rele-
vant confidences, the same reasons for relaxing the presumption
of shared confidences that are present in situation two cases may
be invoked here. The lawyer who is in possession of the confi-
F.2d 1322 (4th Cir. 1976); Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d 824, 827 (2d
Cir. 1955).
85 An example of a situation three case is Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium v. Baxter
Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc). In Novo, an attorney
representing Baxter left the firm and took the Baxter account with him. The lawyer's
former firm then represented the plaintiff in a suit against Baxter. The lawyer moved to
disqualify his old firm. The Seventh Circuit held that the presumption was rebuttable,
and that testimony of the challenged attorneys stating that they had no contact with the
case rebutted the presumption. Id. at 197. In so holding, however, the court noted that
this was a unique situation, in that the moving attorney would have known if confidenc-
es had been disclosed, but had failed to so allege. Id. at 196 n.40.
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• dences has no .incentive to disclose them. Indeed, in the above
example, it would be adverse to X's interest to do so, given that
he still represents XYZ. For such reasons, it appears that when a
lawyer who is in sole possession of confidences leaves a firm, the
lawyer's former firm should not be irrebuttably presumed to have
shared the relevant confidences.
There is a paucity of case law addressing situation three cas-
es, possibly because it is uncommon to have only one attorney
involved in a representation."6 The issues presented by such cas-
es may gain increasing importance in the future when large
groups of attorneys leave a firm, taking many clients with them.
Perhaps in anticipation of this development, Rule 1.10(b) of the
Model Rules expressly permits the law firm to accept the succes-
sive related representation if it can establish that no attorney
remaining in the firm possesses confidential information acquired
in the former representation."
As an example of a more complex situation three scenario,
assume that several members of Firm A's corporate litigation
department are defending XYZ corporation in a securities fraud
case. All the lawyers involved in the case leave Firm A, taking the
XYZ account with them. The plaintiff in a related securities fraud
case against XYZ then asks Firm A to represent him.
These cases, as the Model Rules recognize,8 should be treat-
ed in the same manner as cases in which a single lawyer who is
in sole possession of a client's confidences leaves a firm. In both
situations, a firm should not be disqualified if it can produce
affidavits from the lawyers who left the firm that those lawyers
were in sole possession of the former client's confidences. Al-
though the departed lawyers may be reluctant to provide such
statements, particularly in situations where they are still represent-
ing the firm's former client, courts have the option to subpoena
the lawyers and compel their testimony. Assuming, as one must,
that the lawyers will not perjure themselves, such procedures will
allow the firm to rebut the presumption in a manner adequate to
86 One other situation three case, Donohoe v. Consolidated Operating & Prod.
Corp., 691 F. Supp. 1556 (W.D. Wash. 1986), is discussed infra at notes 146-148 and
accompanying text. Laskey, 244 F.2d 824, may also be analyzed from this perspective.
The firm that the lawyer in Laskey left was a two-person firm. Therefore, if the chal-
lenged lawyer is considered to have been the "firm" which the other attorney left, Laskey
becomes a situation three case.
87 See MODEL RULEs OF PROFEssIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10(b) and comment (1989).
88 Id.
1990]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
protect the former client's interests.
(d) "Situation Four" Cases.-Situation four presents the most
litigated scenario in this area. In such cases, an attorney who
directly represented a client at one firm joins a new firm which
represents an adverse client in the same or a substantially related
matter.
To continue with the same example, assume that X defends
XYZ corporation in a securities fraud case while working at Firm
A. During the litigation, X leaves Firm A and joins the plaintiff's
firm, Firm B. Alternatively, after the litigation terminates, X be-
comes affiliated with Firm B which thereafter seeks to represent
the plaintiff in related litigation against XYZ. In either situation,
presume that X does not work on the case at Firm B.
The debate in situation four cases revolves around the propri-
ety of using screening. mechanisms, commonly known as "Chinese
Walls," to rebut the presumption of shared confidences. Chinese
Walls are "specific institutional mechanisms" which prevent con-
tact between the "tainted" attorney and members of the firm
working on the related matter.8 9 Such mechanisms may be struc-
tural, such as departmentalization, 90 procedural, as in restricting
access to files,91 pecuniary, by denying the tainted attorney any
remuneration from fees derived from the representation, 2 or
educational, such as providing programs that make firm members
aware of the ban on exchange of information." Usually, effective
screening procedures involve all of the above components.94
For example, Firm B in the above scenario should assign X
to a different department, group or office than the department,
group or office that is handling the securities fraud case. Access
to the files of the case should be restricted to those attorneys
directly involved in the litigation. X should not be entitled to any
remuneration from fees generated in the case.95 Further, the
89 See, e.g., Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098, 1101 (10th Cir. 1985).
90 See infra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
91 See supra note 89.
92 See WOLFRAM, supra note 20, at 402.
93 See Developments, supra note 8, at 1368.
94 Id. See Note, The Chinese Wall Defense to Law Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L
REV. 677 (1980).
95 With respect to precluding the tainted attorney from sharing in the fees, one
commentator remains critical:
The economic structure of firms makes a large fee for one attorney redound to
the benefit of all .... [Alt the very least, increasing another lawyer's fees
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firm should circulate memoranda informing all members of the
firm that the case is not to be discussed with X.
(i) Former Government Attorneys.-The earliest situation
four cases in which the presumption of shared confidences was
held rebuttable involved former government attorneys.f6 The
purpose of relaxing the rule in this context is to protect the
government's ability to attract qualified attorneys by removing any
disincentive to entering public service that might result from the
ramifications of vicarious law firm disqualification. 7 For exam-
ple, a lawyer who works as an enforcement attorney for the SEC,
particularly one who has supervisory authority, might find it diffi-
cult to secure- employment with a private firm if any firm the
lawyer entered would be disqualified from participating in matters
adverse and substantially related to cases the attorney worked on
at the SEC. Qualified attorneys would thus be reluctant to accept
employment with government agencies because of the negative
effect on their mobility. To avoid this problem, several courts 8
have held, and the Model Rules99 provide, that law firms may
rebut the presumption of shared confidences in such cases if they
demonstrate that the firm screened the former government attor-
ney from involvement in matters substantially related to cases the
attorney worked on while employed by the government agency.
within a firm enhances the firm's ability to afford overhead and, through refer-
rals and sharing of work within the firm, helps to keep all lawyers productive.
A similar economic interdependence may to some extent characterize some of-
fice-sharing arrangements in which lawyers who are not partners pool their re-
sources to pay for office expenses.
WOLFRAM, supra note 20, at 392.
96 See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated
for lack of jurisdiction, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
97 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342
(1985), reprinted in 62 A.B.A. J. 517 (1986); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr
Rule 1.11(b) (1989); Steinberg, supra note 8, at 590-93.
98 See, e.g., Greitzer & Locks v. Johns-Manville Corp., 710 F.2d 127 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1010 (1982); Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
99 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11(a) (1989). This is not to
suggest that the rle meets with unanimous approbation. In asserting that screening of a
former government attorney was not sufficient to prevent firm-wide disqualification,
Judge Newman, writing for the panel in Armstrong v. McAlpin, stated: "A government
attorney with direct, personal involvement in a matter involving enforcement of laws that
are the bases for private causes of action must understand, and it must appear to the
public, that there will be no possibility of financial reward if he succumbs to the tempta-
tion to shape the government action in the hope of enhancing private employment." 606
F.2d 28, 34 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated for
lack of jurisdiction, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
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The propriety of expanding the above rule to cases involving
non-government attorneys has been the subject of considerable
debate. Some courts and commentators'00 have argued that if
screening mechanisms are sufficient to protect the interests of
former clients in the context of government attorneys, the same is
true in the private sector."1
Other courts1 2 and commentators' have noted that this
argument fails to recognize that vicarious disqualification in situa-
tions involving former government attorneys implicates interests
not present in the context of attorney movement between private
firms. First, because the government deals with all private citizens
and organizations, it has a "much wider circle of adverse legal
interests" than any single law firm."4 A much greater possibility
exists that a government attorney's future clients will be involved
in some dealings with the attorney's former "client." To illustrate,
assume that XYZ corporation makes two related public offerings.
Attorney X works at the SEC where she is involved in an en-
forcement action against XYZ arising from the first offering. In a
related private securities fraud case, attorney Y represents a
plaintiff who purchased shares, in the first offering. After the com-
pletion of both cases, X and Y accept employment at Firm A.
Later, it becomes apparent that XYZ violated securities laws in
the course of the second offering as well. XYZ retains Firm A to
100 See, e.g., Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 263, 277 (7th Cir. 1983)
(Coffey, J., dissenting); Bishop, supra note 3, at 1046.
101 In his dissent in Analytica, Judge Coffee pointed out that:
The irrebuttable presumption that all information is, shared among every attor-
ney in a firm ignores the practical realities of modern day legal practice. The
practice of law has changed dramatically in recent years with many lawyers
working in firms consisting of ... 300 or more attorneys, and with some firms
having offices located throughout the country or even throughout the world.
Additionally, the trend within law firms has been toward greater specialization
and departmentalization. Surely, it defies logic and common sense to establish a
presumption, with no opportunity for rebuttal, that every individual lawyer in
such a multi-member and multi-specialized firm has substantial knowledge of the
confidences of each of the firm's clients. Recognizing these realities of the mod-
ern practice of law, we must continue to take a more realistic view toward the
law of attorney disqualification by allowing the presumption that confidences
have been shared throughout a firm to be rebuttable ....
708 F.2d at 1274.
102 See, e.g., Cheng v. G.A.F. Corp., 631 F.2d 1052, 1058 n.7 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated
for lack of jurisdiction, 450 U.S. 903 (1981); Amoco Chemicals Corp. v. MacArthur, 568 F.
Supp. 42, 47 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
103 See, e.g., Developments, supra note 8, at 1364.
104 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 comment (1989).
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represent it in any litigation arising from the second offering.
In actions arising from the second offering, the employment
of Y is not as likely to present disqualification problems for Firm
A as the employment of Y Disqualification issues generally arise
in successive representation cases if the second matter is substan-
tially related to the prior matter and invokes interests materially
adverse to the former client.10 5 Hence, the potential for dis-
qualification is normally only as great as the possibility that the
later related matter will adversely affect a lawyer's former cli-
ent.106 In the above example, unless Y's former client bought
shares in the second offering, disqualification issues as to Y will
rarely arise as it is unlikely that any litigation arising out of the
second offering will involve Y's former client."0  On the other
hand, any federal civil enforcement action arising from the sec-
ond'offering will necessarily involve X's former "client" since the
SEC is the only party that brings such actions. The employment
of X thus raises a greater potential for disqialification than the
employment of Y.
Supervisory capacities at governmental agencies exacerbate
the problem raised in the above example. If X serves as the Di-
rector of Enforcement at the SEG, she will participate in many
investigations during her tenure at the SEC. Further, these mat-
ters will involve a greater number of individuals and corporations
than any law firm could possibly represent. If a firm that X subse-
quently joined were disqualified from representing any of these
clients in related litigation, X might find it very difficult to secure
employment in the private sector.'
105 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 comment (1989) (Disquali-
fication caused by the successive representation may be waived by the former client.).
106 Even if the former client is not an adverse party in the current representation;
the lawyer cannot use confidential information (other than generally known information)
derived from the former representation to the disadvantage of the former client. Id. See
also infra note 108.
107 It is unlikely that any confidential information derived from the prior representa-
tion will be used by Y to the disadvantage of the former client. See supra note 106.
Nevertheless, there exist situations where successive representation may adversely affect
the former client's interests, 'even where the former client is not a party to the present
litigation. See, e.g., Don King Productions, Inc. v. Harlow, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 1 94,089 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
108 Model Rule 1.11(a) disqualifies the former government attorney only as to those
matters in which he or she "participated personally and substantially" while serving with
the government. The appropriate government agency may consent to the former govern-
ment attorney personally participating in the subsequent matter after disclosure is made
to the agency of the conflict. By requiring that the former government attorney must
participate "personally and substantially" in order to be disqualified, the Model Rules
1990]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
For these reasons, vicarious disqualification has a broader
reach in the context of government attorneys. Moreover, the ap-
plication of an irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences in
cases involving former government attorneys may harm the very
"client" that the presumption is intended to protect. The focus of
the presumption of shared confidences is to protect a former
client's interests. °9 When the government is the former client,
an irrebuttable presumption may actually work against the
"client's" long term interests by impeding its ability to attract
qualified counsel. The purpose of the presumption-protecting
the former client-is frustrated, and warrants a relaxation of the
presumption. Recognizing this policy justification, the Model
Rules,110 several courts"' as well as other sources'12 permit
a law firm to implement effective screening mechanisms and avert
vicarious disqualification in the former government attorney con-
apparently provide greater leeway than the Model Code. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-101(B) states that "[a] lawyer shall not accept private employment
in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee."
The former government attorney also must be concerned with the Federal Conflict
of Interest Statutes, Pub. L. No. 87-849, § 1(a), 76 Stat. 1123 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 207(a)-(c)(1962)). The Ethics in Government Act imposes several restrictions
on post-employment conduct by a former government employee:
- First, it bars a former government employee from ever making an appear-
ance before or a communication to a court, or agency on behalf of a party in a
particular matter in which he participated personally and substantially while in
government service.
- Second, the Act places a two year ban on appearing before or communicat-
ing with a court or an agency on behalf of a party in a particular matter which
was pending under the employee's official responsibility in his last year of gov-
ernment service.
- Third, the Act also imposes a one year ban on senior government officials
from appearing before their former agencies on any matter, including new mat-
ters ....
Mundheim, Conflict of Interest and the Former Government Employee: Rethinking the Revolving
Door, 14 CREIGHTON L REv. 707, 714 (1981).
109 See supra notes 22-26, 36 and accompanying text.
110 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11(b) (1989).
111 See cases cited supra note 98.
112 See e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342
(1975) reprinted in 62 A.B.A. J. 517, 518 (1976) ("[T]he ability of government to recruit
young professionals and competent lawyers should not be interfered with by imposition
of harsh restraints upon future practice nor should too great a sacrifice be demanded of
the lawyers willing to enter government service.").
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text."'3 This analysis is inapplicable outside the government at-
torney context. Private sector cases require a separate examina-
tion.
(ii) Non-Government Attorneys. -The ABA Model Rules do
not approve of the use of screening outside of the former govern-
ment attorney context.1 1 4 Nevertheless, a number of lower feder-
al courts adhere to a contrary viewpoint. For example, the Sev-
enth Circuit is at the forefront of a movement allowing rebuttal
of the presumption of shared confidences in situation four cases
that deal with non-government attorneys. In a series of decisions
in the early 1980s, that court indicated that a law firm may rebut,
the presumption by the use of screening mechanisms." 5
In Schiessle v. Stephens,"6 the Seventh Circuit heard a case in
which an attorney who represented one of the multiple defen-
dants withdrew and joined the firm representing the plaintiffs in
the same case." 7 In deciding whether to disqualify the plaintiff's
firm, the court first noted that disqualification is a "drastic mea-
sure which courts should hesitate to impose unless absolutely
necessary."" 8 The court then set forth a three-step test for de-
ciding disqualification motions:
(1) The court must first determine if a substantial relationship
exists between the subject matter of the prior and subsequent
representations.
(2) The court must next determine whether the presumption
113 Several commentators have discussed the propriety of screening mechanisms in
the former government attorney context. See, e.g., Cutler, Conflicts of Interest, 30 EMORY
UJ. 1015, 1022-27 (1981); Ferber & Gonson, Disqualifwation of Law Firms, 13 REv. SEC.
REG. 875 (1980); Murphy, Vicarious Disqualification of Government Lawyers, 69 A.B.A. J.
299 (1983); Comment, Disqualfcations of Counsek Adverse Interests and Revolving Doors, 81
COLUM. L REv. 199, 209-16 (1981); Note, The Former Government Attorney and the Cod of
Professional Responsibility: Insulation or Disqualkication?, 26 CATH. U.L REV. 402 (1977);
Note, Ethical Problems for the Law Firm of a Former Government Attorney: Firm or Individual
Disqualykication?, 1977 DUKE UJ. 512; Note, Conflicts of Interest and the Former Government
Attorney, 65 GEo. UJ. 1025 (1977); Note, The Chinese Wall Defense to Law Firm Disqualifi-
cation, 128 U. PA. L REv. 677 (1980); Note, The Future of the Chinese Wall Defense to
Vicarious Disqualification of a Former Government Attorney's Law Firm, 38 WASH. & LEE L
REV. 151 (1981).
114 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.10 comment (1989).
115 See, e.g., Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1983); Analytica, Inc.
v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1983); Freeman v. Chicago Musical
Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 1982).
116 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983).
117 Id. at 418.
118 Id. at 420 (quoting Freeman, 689 l7.2d at 721).
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of shared confidences has been rebutted with respect to the
prior representation.
(3) Finally, the court must determine whether the presump-
tion is rebutted as to the present representation."'
All such presumptions must be "clearly and effectively" rebut-
ted. 120
Applying the above test, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
the representations were substantially related and that the primary
attorney received confidences at his former firm. The court assert-
ed that the effective use of Chinese Walls to screen the lawyer
from involvement in the case at the new firm could rebut the
presumption of shared confidences. The court observed, however,
that in this case the new firm had failed to institute such proce-
dures. The Schiessle court, therefore, affirmed the district court's
order of disqualification.1 21
Manning v. Waring Co James, Sklar & Allen 22 is a more
119 717 F.2d at 420.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 421. At least four other circuits have indicated that they are considering
allowing the presumption of shared confidences to be rebutted in situation four cases.
The status of the law is unclear in the Second Circuit, Huntington v. Great Western Re-
sources, 655 F. Supp. 565, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (suggesting presumption may only be re-
buttable in situation 2 cases) and the Eighth Circuit, EZ Paintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc., 746
F.2d 1459, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (status of law unclear in Eighth Circuit). The Ninth
and Tenth Circuits have expressly left the question open. Paul E. Iacono Structural
Eng'r, Inc. v. Humphrey, 722 F.2d 435, 439 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 851 (1983);
Atasi Corp. v. Seagate Technolgy, 847 F.2d 826 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting open question
in Ninth Circuit); Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098 (10th Cir. 1985). A number of
states also permit screening mechanisms to avert firm-wide disqualification, see, e.g.,
Jenson v. Touche Ross & Co., 335 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1983), and certain state ethical
rules do so as well, see e.g., PENNSYLVANIA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.10(b) (1987).
122 849 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1988). Manning involved two litigations. The first was a
state court action relating to a dispute between' bondholders, bond counsel, and others.
Bond counsel was represented by the firm of Heiskell, Donelson, Bearman, Adams,
Williams, & Kirsch. The second action was brought by the bondholders as a class against
an underwriter. The underwriter's counsel was Mr. Hatzenbuehler of the firm of Boone,
Wellford, Clark, Langschmidt & Pemberton. During the course of the second litigation,
Mr. Hatzenbuehler left Boone, Wellford and joined Heiskell, Donelson (the bond
counsel's firm), but continued to represent the underwriter. The underwriter, however,
decided to join the bond counsel as a third-party defendant. Mr. Hatzenbuehler terminat-
ed his relationship with the underwriter, and the bond counsel again retained its old
firm, Heiskell, Donelson. The underwriter moved for disqualification of Heiskell,
Donelson on the grounds that Mr. Hatzenbuehler had obtained confidential information
which should be imputed to the other members of his firm. Id. at 223-24.
The Sixth Circuit noted that there was no question as to whether Mr.
Hatzenbuehler himself was disqualified, and addressed the vicarious disqualification of his
firm. After examining relevant case law in the Seventh Circuit, the court held that the
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recent federal court of appeals decision holding that the presump-
tion of shared confidences is rebuttable in situation four cases. In-
Manning, the Sixth Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit's ap-
proach,123 but indicated that it may limit its holding to cases
where disqualification would work a hardship on the client.
124
Although these Sixth and Seventh Circuit cases indicate that
the use of Chinese Walls in situation four cases may rebut the
presumption of shared confidences, none of the decisions held
that the facts of the particular case justified rebuttal of the pre-
sumption. A number of district court cases, however, have found
the presumption rebutted.
125
Of the cases involving attorney movement, situation four
cases present the greatest potential for disclosure of client confi-
dences. In such cases, the timely implementation' 26 of compre-
hensive Chinese Walls may prevent the inadvertent disclosure of
confidences. 27 Common forms of Chinese Walls include struc-
tural, procedural and educational methods which may (1) prohibit
the attorney from having any connection with the case or receiv-
ing any share of the fees attributable to it, (2) ban relevant discus-
sion with or the transfer of relevant documents to or from the
tainted attorney, (3) restrict access to files, (4) educate all mem-
presumption of shared confidences is rebuttable in such cases. Id. at 226. The court
then remanded to the district court for further factual findings. Id. at 227-28.
123 Id. at 225.
124 Id. ("Where, as here, it has been demonstrated that disqualification will work a
hardship, it is dear that the quarantined lawyer was privy to confidential information re-
ceived from the former client now seeking disqualification of the lawyer's present firm,
and there is a substantial relationship between the subject matter of the prior and
present representations, then the district court must determine whether the presumption
of shared confidences has been rebutted.").
125 See, e.g., Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, Aetna, Fed. Ins. Co., 632 F. Supp. 418 (D.
Del. 1986) (presumption rebutted by "cone of silence"); Kapco Mfg. Co. v. C&O Enter.,
Inc., 637 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. II. 1985) (holding presumption applicable to secretary
who switched firms but that presumption rebutted); NFC, Inc. v. General Nutrition, Inc.,
562 F. Supp. 332 (D. Mass. 1983) (imposing Chinese Walls by court order).
126 It is essential to implement timely the Chinese Wall. Establishment of screening
mechanisms on an untimely basis, such as sometime after the tainted attorney becomes
affiliated with the firm, does not adequately protect against inadvertent disclosure. See,
e.g., EZ Paintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc., 746 F.2d 1459, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (applying
Eighth Circuit law) (screening mechanisms put in place three months after tainted
attorney joined firm not sufficient to avert vicarious disqualification); Brodeur, Building
Chinese Walls: Current Implementation and a Proposal for Reforming Law Firm Disqualification,
7 REv. LrrG. 167, 183 (1988) ("Institutional mechanisms, no matter how perfect in
form, must be put in place immediately upon the creation of a risk that client confi-
dences could'be disclosed inadvertently to members of the new firm.").
127 But see WOLFRAM, snpia note 20, at 402 (expressing skepticism toward integrity of
institutional screening mechanisms to avert law firm vicarious disqualification).
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bers of the firm as to the importance of the wall, (5) separate,
both organizationally and physically, groups of attorneys working
on conflicting matters, and (6) mandate that the tainted attorney
and all lawyers of the firm affirm by affidavit under oath that
they have not breached the Chinese Wall. In addition, if someone
raises a judicial challenge against the screening mechanisms that a
firm uses to avert firm-wide vicarious disqualification, such mecha-
nisms should be subject to court order and supervision, including
protective orders. Noncompliance with these orders raises the
possibility of contempt sanctions.1 28
Guarding against intentional disclosures is another difficult
issue. Unlike situations one through three, the lawyer in posses-
sion of the confidences is a member, of the same firm as the
attorneys directly involved in the successive representation. As a
consequence, those privy to the confidential information may ben-
efit other members of the same firm and ultimately themselves by
disclosing such confidences. Chinese Walls are of little value in
protecting against intentional disclosure.
12
To illustrate, suppose lawyer T is an associate at Firm A and
directly represents XYZ corporation. T moves to Firm B which
represents the plaintiff in a related suit against XYZ. Screening
mechanisms are timely instituted. A senior partner at Firm B then
confers with the new associate T and requests confidential infor-
mation about XYZ, assuring T he will keep it "under his hat." As
a career-minded junior associate, T may be hard pressed to re-
fuse. Screening mechanisms are ineffective against such intention-
al conduct.'3 0
On balance, it appears that a court should permit the rebut-
tal of the presumption of shared confidences in situation four
cases when the challenged firm "clearly and effectively"' dem-
onstrates that the potential for disclosure of confidences is mini-
mal. Given the potential for abuse and the appearance of impro-
128 See Brodeur, supra note 126, at 182-85; Note, The Chinese Wall Defense to Law
Firm Disqualrwication, 128 U. PA. L REV. 677, 708 (1980). Protective orders in this con-
text may be defined as "court-ordered barriers against the exchange of information with
an attorney possessing confidences or secrets that create an ethical problem." Lerner,
Eliminating the Gamesmanship: Motions to Disqualify Opposing Counsel, 191 N.Y.LJ. 5 (1984).
129 See WOLFRAM, supra note 20, at 402 ("[Tjhere is little but the self-serving assur-
ance of the screening-lawyer foxes that they will carefully guard the screened-lawyer
chickens.").
130 I&
131 The Seventh Circuit adopted the "clearly and effectively" standard in Schiessle v.
Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983).
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priety, application of this standard should require the firm to
satisfy a rigorous burden. In addition to those mechanisms sped-
fled above,"3 2 the firm seeking to avert vicarious disqualification
should establish that the "tainted" attorney is a member of a de-
partment or group that is not in any way involved in the subject
litigation. Alternatively, the firm may demonstrate that the tainted
lawyer practices in an office in a different geographic location
and works principally, if not exclusively, with attorneys in that of-
fice. Second, the firm should establish that, at the time the
tainted attorney accepted employment with the firm, there were
procedures in place to restrict the flow of confidential informa-
tion between the relevant departments and offices. Third, the
firm should demonstrate, through the production of contempora-
neous policy statements, memoranda, and evidence of any prior
compliance, a firm-wide commitment to a policy prohibiting for-
mal or informal discussion of cases with attorneys (and other
personnel) who were involved in representing adverse parties in
related matters.
These procedures, particularly the assignment of the tainted
lawyer to a different department or office, could pose insur-
mountable obstacles for small firms and may even present signifi-
cant problems for large firms. For example, if a firm hires an
attorney who specializes in securities litigation, the firm will obvi-
ously w* ant to assign that attorney to the corporate litigation de-
partment. That department will likely be the *same department
involved in any litigation adverse to the lawyer's former clients.
To allow tainted attorneys to work in the same. department
or office as the primary attorneys in a successive representation,
however, would present an unacceptably high risk of disclosure.
Over the course of years that it may take to litigate a case, the
tainted lawyer would have daily informal contact with lawyers
directly involved in the related representation. The potential for
disclosure of confidences, whether intentional or inadvertent, is
simply too great.
Although the procedures suggested above will not eliminate
the risk of disclosure of confidences, they will considerably reduce
the possibility of disclosure. MoreoVer, such procedures further
the interests of attorney mobility and the current client's right to
counsel of choice.
132 See supra notes 127-129 and accompanying text
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E. The Effect of Courts of Appeals Decisions On Lower Federal Courts
The various situations in which vicarious disqualification is-
sues arise present different concerns and warrant separate treat-
ment. Moreover, if we examine only the end result (not the rea-
soning), courts of appeals appear to have recognized this distinc-
tion. The appellate courts are more likely to grant disqualification
motions in situation four cases than in cases involving situations
one through three.
Generally, the language contained in decisions in this area
fails to distinguish between the four scenarios, and the holdings
do not expressly limit themselves to similar factual situations.8 3
Rather, some appellate court decisions contain broad language as
to whether a firm may rebut the presumption and what steps it
must take to do so.13 4 This deficiency has led to the improper
application of such decisions by some lower courts.
An example of this phenomenon is United States ex rel. Lord
Electric Co. v. Titan Paciflc Construction,3 5 a situation four case.
In Lord Electric, the challenged attorney was "of counsel" to the
plaintiff firm. The court disqualified the attorney because he had
personally represented the defendants in a previous substantially
related matter.'3 6 Because the court held that the attorney's firm
had rebutted the presumption of shared confidences -even
though the firm had not instituted significant screening mecha-
nisms'31 -it did not disqualify.the firm. 3 ' The court stated
that such mechanisms are not necessary,3 9 and based its hold-
ing primarily on affidavits that disclaimed the sharing of confi-
dences.
40
133 See Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (applying standard Seventh Circuit analysis in situation one case); Freeman V.
Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 723 (7th Cir. 1982) (applying standard
Seventh Circuit analysis even though motion based on double imputation of knowledge
(situation one)); Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc.,
607 F.2d 186, 190 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (applying general test in situation three
case).
134 See cases cited supra note 133.
135 637 F. Supp. 1556 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
136 Id. at 1561-62.
137 The firm simply instructed the lawyers not to speak of the matter and made the
conclusory statement that access to the files was restricted. Id. at 1566.
138 Id. at 1568.
139 Id. at 1565.
140 Id. at 1566. The court also ordered the imposition of screening mechanisms in
the future. Id. at 1566-67.
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The Lord Electric court's holding-that Chinese Walls are not
necessary to rebut the presumption of shared confidences in a
situation four case-stems directly from a court of appeals failure
to distinguish between situations one and four. The district court
relied on the Federal Circuit's decision in Panduit Corp. v. All
States Plastic.14 ' Panduit, however, concerned a disqualification
motion in a situation one case. The previous litigation did not in-
volve the attorney while he was at his former firm nor was he in-
volved in the successive representation at the new firm.4 4 The
Panduit court held that the use of Chinese Walls was not neces-
sary to rebut the presumption of shared confidences. 143 This
holding appears sound, as situation one cases present a less per-
suasive scenario for disqualification than many other cases.
144
The Panduit court, however, did not expressly limit its holding to
cases with similar' fact patterns. This omission allowed the Lord
Electric court to apply the Panduit holding in a situation four case,
which presents a much more compelling argument for disqualifi-
cation.
Another disconcerting development is that due to the vague-
ness and inconsistency of decisions in this area, there exists the
danger that some courts may ignore the presumption of shared
confidences altogether. Donohoe v. Consolidated Operating & Produc-
tion Corp.'4 5 provides a striking example. In Donohoe, the defen-
dant moved to disqualify the plaintiffs 'law firm on the basis that
a lawyer who once worked for the firm had represented the de-
fendant in a prior related case. The lawyer had since left the
firm; a situation three case."" The court found that the firm
had not rebutted the presumption of shared confidences, but
nonetheless it refused to disqualify the firm. The court held that
disqualification would involve substantial harm to the plaintiff.
The court concluded that, the client had probably already received
any confidences that the firm had in its possession. Therefore, the
court reasoned, disqualification would not have any positive ef-
fect. 4
7
141 744 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (applying Seventh Circuit law).
142 Id. at 1577-79. Indeed, under the peripheral representation exception, the attor-
ney would not be personally disqualified from providing legal counsel in the successive
matter. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
143 744 F.2d at 1580.
144 See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
145 691 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. 111. 1988).
146 See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
147 Donohoe, 691 F. Supp. at 118-19.
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Lord Electric and Donohoe, along with other decisions, 148
raise the concern that the state of the law relating to conflicts of
interest in successive representations may become far too uncer-
tain. To remedy this situation, courts should adopt different rules
for each of the above scenarios. In so doing, courts should de-
velop a standard for rebutting the presumption in each situation
that takes into account the varying risks of disclosure presented:
namely, the most stringent standard for situation four cases,
which present the greatest danger for disclosure of confidences,
and varying lesser standards in each of situations one through
three. This Article seeks to implement this suggestion by setting
forth applicable standards. If the framework proposed herein
were adopted, it would further sound policy objectives as well as
provide much needed consistency in this area.149
IV. CHINESE WALLS IN SIMULTANEOUS REPRESENTATION CASES
The increasing acceptance of the use of Chinese Walls in
successive representation matters will likely prompt the corporate
bar to renew the promotion of use of such mechanisms in simul-
taneous representation cases. Such an argument has some facial
appeal. A closer examination, however, demonstrates that the
imposition of Chinese Walls in such situations would not ade-
quately address the underlying policy of the rule which bars si-
multaneous representation of adverse clients.
As noted earlier, the primary policy underlying the bar
against simultaneous representation of adverse parties is the duty
of loyalty.15 Every client has the right to his or her attorney's
148 See e.g., Nemours Found. v. Gilbane, Aetna, Fed. Ins. Co., 632 F. Supp. 418, 428
(D. Del. 1986).
149 It should be recognized that irrespective of the efficacy of the Chinese Wall in
place, serious problems remain. The foremost problem is that the wall may not be
adequate to deter intentional breaches. Another. problem is that such walls do not foster
public confidence; the details of a law firm's compliance with the applicable procedures
will have only a small impact upon the public's impression. A third problem is that
these procedures disproportionately affect smaller firms. They are less likely to imple-
ment effective screening procedures as compared to firms with hundreds of attorneys or
multiple offices situated in different locales. The implementation of effective screening
mechanisms is often impractical in the small firm setting due to closer working relation-
ships, the lack of having multiple intra-firm departments, and the awareness that firm
lawyers have with respect to a large percentage of client matters. See authorities cited
supra notes 128-129; Riger, Disqualifying Counsel in Corporate Representation-Eroding Stan-
dards in Changing Times, 34 U. MIAMI L REV. 995 (1980).
150 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
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undivided loyalty. 51 Such a policy assures a client that the
lawyer's loyalty to another client will not impair the exercise of
the lawyer's independent professional judgment. Simultaneous
representation presents the risk 'that an attorney may breach this
duty by favoring the interests of a more important client over
those of a less favored client..52
Moreover, the breach of the lawyer's duty of undivided loyal-
ty may have adverse effects on the judicial system. A principal
tenet of the American judicial system is that the most effective
means of reaching the truth is a clash between opposing parties.
This proposition rests on the assumption that opposing attorneys,
within the bounds of legal and ethical norms, will engage in a
zealous, uninhibited presentation of their clients' positions. When
loyalties to another client impair a lawyer's representation, it un-
dermines the legitimacy of the system.'5" Consistent with the
above principles, courts have rejected the use of screening proce-
dures to avert firm-wide disqualification in simultaneous represen-
tation cases.154
Irrespective of a law firm's size and the presence of multiple
offices, clients tend io identify legal representation not only by
the particular attorneys working on the matter but also by the law
firm that the client chooses to retain. Even though the ciient may
waive the conflict,'55 simultaneous representation of clients hav-
ing adverse interests raises the specter of firm disloyalty to the af-
fected client. The Model Rules recognize this dual loyalty dilemma
by providing that the law firm retained "is essentially one lawyer
for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client." "'S As
a consequence, each lawyer and the firm as a whole are bound by
151 Id. See also United States v. Nabisco,. 117 F.R.D. 40, 44-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
152 See Picker Int'l, Inc. v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 869 F.2d 578, 583 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(applying Sixth and Tenth Circuit law) ("To allow the merged firm to pick and choose
which clients will survive the merger would.violate the duty of undivided loyalty that the
firms owe each of their clients under DR 5-105.").
153 See Developments, supra note 8, at 1294-96.
154 There have been very few decisions addressing this issue. See Manning v. Waring,
Cox, James, Sklar & Allen, 849 F.2d 222, 227-28 (6th Cir. 1988) (Merritt, J., concurring);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 855 (1978); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d
225, 233 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that simultaneous representation of adverse clients
breaches the client's "absolute right to the firm's undivided loyalty"). The Seventh
Circuit's decision in Westinghouse has limited impact in this context as the court princi-
pally addressed the breach of confidence concern of Canon 4 of the Model Code rather
than Canon 5's dual loyalty focus. 580 F.2d at 1321.
155 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7, 1.10(c) (1989).
156 Id. Rule 1.10 comment.
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the duty of loyalty. Chinese Walls and other such screening proce-
dures have no place in this context, as these mechanisms focus on
client confidentiality concerns.
57
The following scenario provides an example of the possible
adverse effects of simultaneous representation. Assume that X is
an attorney in the Salt Lake City office of Firm A, a large firm
based principally in New York City. One of Firm A's valued cli-
ents is Giant Computer Company, a publicly-held company which
lists its securities on the New York Stock Exchange. Over the past
twenty years, Firm A, through its New York City office, has
served as Giant's securities counsel in stock offerings, SEC filings,
and securities law advisory issues. At no time has Firm A repre-
sented Giant in any litigation matter. The Salt Lake City office of
firm A, on the other hand, has never worked on any matter in-
volving Giant, and does not otherwise possess any confidential
information pertaining to Giant.
The proprietor of Tiny Computer Sales, a small retail com-
puter store in Salt Lake City, retains Firm A and X in particular
to represent Tiny in a breach of contract action against Giant. X
believes he can zealously represent Tiny without upsetting Giant
because another law firm represents Giant in this matter and the
amount in dispute is relatively small. X thereupon obtains Giant's
and Tiny's consent to the dual representation and accepts the
case.
After a few months of discovery, it becomes apparent that
Tiny may have a colorable antitrust claim against Giant. More-
over, although the contract dispute is relatively minor, an antitrust
suit could involve a significant amount of damages and set a pre-
cedent that would be disastrous for Giant. Because X is aware
that Giant is one of Firm A's valued clients, he may be reluctant
to assert such a claim. Moreover, in any action against Giant, X
may be unwilling to engage in aggressive discovery or cross-exami-
nation that may alienate or embarrass Giant or its executives.
Tiny is thus deprived of the benefit of X's (and Firm A's) unim-
paired professional judgment and loyalty.
The fact that the firm isolates X from any other attorney who
may possess relevant confidences of Giant will not solve these
problems. The impairment of X's loyalty arises from his knowl-
157 Id. (adopting the rule of imputed disqualification which "gives effect to the
principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who [currently] practice in a law
firm."). See also Miller & Warren, Conflicts of Interest and Ethical Issues for the Inside and
Outside Counsel, 40 Bus. LAw. 631, 647 (1985).
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edge that Giant is a large and valued client while Tiny is a small
and relatively unimportant client. The imposition of Chinese Walls
may prevent X from disclosing Tiny's confidences to Giant, or
Giant's confidences to Tiny, but they will not erase X's knowledge
that keeping Giant as a client is of paramount importance to the
law firm.
Of course, some simultaneous representation cases may not
present such a compelling case for disqualification as the above
example. Law firms may sometimes engage in simultaneous repre-
sentation involving unrelated matters of two adverse clients, with
no negative effect on either client. However, allowing simulta-
neous representation in such cases could well present insurmount-
able problems of line drawing. For example, when is one client so
large or valued that we can assume the firm is not exercising
independent judgment on behalf of a smaller adverse client?
For these reasons, we should preserve the general rule which
states that simultaneous representation of adverse clients is im-
proper. The rule may reduce the revenues of some firms, but that
is a small price to pay for protecting the integrity of the judicial
system and preserving a client's right to the unimpaired exercise
of counsel's professional judgment.
V. CONCLUSION
The approach thus far adopted by a number of courts and
the rules of professional ethics in relaxing the presumption of
shared confidences is largely inadequate. By failing to recognize
that each of the situations in which issues of vicarious disqualifica-
tion arise presents different problems and, therefore, warrants
separate treatment, courts have developed precedents that may
lead to improper results. Until the courts and the drafters of
professional ethics rules recognize this distinction, this area of the
law will remain confused and inadequate.
If courts were to develop a more sound analysis, the relax-
ation of the presumption of shared confidences could further the
interests of attorney mobility and the right to counsel of choice
while preserving client confidences. The use of effective Chinese
Walls in this area is often helpful. Nevertheless, courts should not
extend the use of such mechanisms to simultaneous representa-
tion cases, where they are of little use in protecting the relevant
interests of clients and' the judicial system.
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